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Abstract
We present a framework, called AIR, for verifying safety properties of assembly language pro-
grams via software model checking. AIR extends the applicability of predicate abstraction and
counterexample guided abstraction refinement to the automated verification of low-level software.
By working at the assembly level, AIR allows verification of programs for which source code is
unavailable–such as legacy and COTS software–and programs that use features–such as pointers,
structures, and object-orientation–that are problematic for source-level software verification tools.
In addition, AIR makes no assumptions about the underlying compiler technology. We have imple-
mented a prototype of AIR and present encouraging results on several non-trivial examples.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, there has been considerable advancement in the theory and practice of automated
formal software verification. One of the most promising paradigms to emerge in this area is software
model checking (SMC) [3] – a combination of counterexample guided abstraction refinement [11] with
predicate abstraction [18]. SMC verifies that a program P satisfies a specification φ iteratively, as follows:
1. (Abstraction) Construct a conservative modelM from P via predicate abstraction. Go to Step 2.
2. (Verification)Model checkM |= φ . If this is the case, then terminate with result P |= φ . Otherwise
let CE be a counterexample toM |= φ returned by the model checker. Go to Step 3.
3. (Validation) Check whether CE corresponds to some concrete behavior of P. If this is the case,
then we obtain a real counterexample and terminate with P 6|= φ . Otherwise, CE is a spurious
counterexample. Go to Step 4.
4. (Refinement) Construct a more precise modelM′ that does not admit CE as a behavior and repeat
from Step 2 with M =M′.
Variations of the above process have been investigated by several research groups [3, 19, 9] with con-
siderable success on source code derived from real-life examples. However, there has been considerably
less work on applying SMC to verify machine-level programs. In this paper, we show that in spite of
the absence of high-level information, such as variable names and branch conditions, the effectiveness
of SMC extends to even low-level software. More specifically, we present a SMC-based procedure for
verifying safety properties of PowerPCTM assembly programs. Our approach, which we call Assembly
Iterative Refinement or AIR, consists of two broad phases:
1. Decompilation: In this stage, we translate the target assembly program A and safety property φA
into an equivalent C program P and safety property φP. In essence, we treat each register as a
global variable. Each procedure in A leads to a corresponding procedure in P, and each assembly
instruction produces one or more C statements. We present further details of the decompilation
process in Section 3. Note that C is particularly suited as the target language of decompilation
because: (i) C supports bit-level operations that are critical for preserving the semantics of assem-
bly instructions during decompilation; (ii) we are able to build on existing infrastructures for C
verification to perform the next stage of AIR.
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2. Verification: In this stage, we use SMC to check P |= φP. Since decompilation is semantics-
preserving, the result obtained in this stage for P also applies to the original assembly program
A. Furthermore, any counterexample obtained with respect to P is transformed to a corresponding
counterexample with respect to A. Further details about verification can be found in Section 4.
AIR extends the applicability of SMC to assembly program verification, and yields several tangible
benefits. First, AIR does not require source code, and thus is applicable to software – such as legacy,
proprietary, and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software – for which source code is often not avail-
able. Second, unlike source code analysis, AIR analyzes exactly what is to be executed and makes no
assumptions about any compiler technology being used. Thus, it eliminates the need to ensure compiler
correctness, and reduces the size of the trusted computing base. This is especially desirable when analyz-
ing safety-critical systems. Third, AIR is not tied to any specific high-level programming language, and
consequently is more versatile than source-code verification. In particular, AIR is able to sidestep fea-
tures, such as pointers, structures, and object-orientation, which are problematic for source-level analysis
tools. Finally, since AIR decompilation is semantics preserving and targets the C language, it enables us
to leverage existing and emerging C analysis tools for verification. Thus, even though we experiment
with SMC-based tools, other C verifiers (e.g., CBMC [7] and F-Soft [21]) are also applicable.
We have implemented AIR and obtained encouraging results on several non-trivial benchmarks de-
rived from Linux device drivers and an embedded OS. Further details can be found in Section 5. The rest
of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey related work. The decompilation and ver-
ification stages of AIR are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, we present experimental
results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
Following SLAM [3], several other projects – e.g., MAGIC [9] and BLAST [19] – have investigated the
use of the SMC paradigm for C source code verification. A number of projects – such as SPIN [20],
Java PathFinder [32], BANDERA [17], BOGOR [16], Behave! [4], and ZING [1] – have also looked at
software verification, but not necessarily via SMC. Instead, their focus has been on other languages, such
as Java, and other program features, such as concurrency. Decompilers have been traditionally developed
for binary understanding and reverse engineering, and not for verification per se. Nevertheless, the use
of decompilation for verification has been suggested by Breuer and Bowen [6], and by Curzon [14] for
verifying micro-code.
The verification of low-level software [12, 27] has also received a lot of attention. A number of ap-
proaches are based on either theorem proving, type checking, or static analysis. For example, Boyer and
Yu have verified object code for the MC68020 processor using the Nqthm theorem prover [5]. Yu [33]
has proposed the use of certified assembly programming and type preserving translations for ensuring
the safety of low-level code. His techniques are powerful but require considerable manual intervention,
e.g., via type annotations and the use of proof assistants. Yu and Shao [34] have also proposed a logic
based type system for the static verification of concurrent assembly programs.
Reps et al. [30] have used static analysis algorithms to recover information about the contents of
memory locations and how they are manipulated by executables. They have also created CodeSurfer/x86,
a prototype tool for browsing, inspecting and analyzing x86 binaries. Our technique is based on model
checking, is completely automated, and targets PowerPCTM assembly code. Balakrishnan et al. [2]
have used model checking to analyze stripped device driver executables. Their approach is not based on
decompilation to C, but on a tight combination of their own model checker and control-flow-graph-based
internal representation for the target executables.
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Another approach for ensuring the correctness of low-level programs is source code verification
combined with compiler validation, i.e., proving that the compiler always produces a target code which
correctly implements the source code. In practice, proving compiler correctness is extremely tedious.
Furthermore, any change in the compiler necessitates its revalidation. Our technique is impervious to the
underlying compiler technology. A complementary technique is translation validation [28] where instead
of validating the compiler, each individual run of the compiler is followed by a validation phase which
verifies that the target code produced on that run correctly implements the submitted source program.
Both compiler validation and translation validation assume that the source code is available and has been
independently verified. Our approach does not require such an assumption.
3 Decompilation
The first stage of AIR is the decompilation of the target assembly program A into an equivalent C program
P. In this section we describe the decompilation procedure using a small assembly program as a running
example. For ease of understanding, we start with the source code from which A was compiled. Fig. 1
shows a small C code fragment P0 on the left and the result of compiling it with gcc on the right. P0 is
derived from MICRO-C, a lightweight operating system for real-time embedded applications. For brevity
and simplicity we eliminated some irrelevant code from the actual MICRO-C sources. Also, the assembly
A on the right of Fig. 1 does not contain some book-keeping information generated by gcc.
We use the 32-bit variant of the PowerPCTM instruction set architecture (ISA) and assume little-
endian mode. The PowerPCTM architecture defines 32 32-bit general purpose registers (GPRs) – re-
ferred to in A as %r0 through %r31. In addition, there are 32 64-bit floating point registers (FPRs) –
referred to as %f0 through %f31 – and a few special registers (SPRs), e.g., condition register (%cr),
link register (%lr), etc. An assembly program consists of a set of blocks, each beginning with a
label. A label is either a procedure name (OSMemNameSet) or begins with a dot (.L1 ... .L4).
The procedures OS ENTER CRITICAL and OS EXIT CRITICAL acquire and release a global lock for
achieving mutual exclusion. We wish to verify whether our program satisfies the following property:
(Safety) OS ENTER CRITICAL and OS EXIT CRITICAL are invoked alternately, beginning with a call to
OS ENTER CRITICAL. Note that Safety is representative of a general class of safety specifications with
respect to the acquisition and release of resources. Also, our example program does not satisfy Safety.
Indeed, if the conditions of the first two if statements are both satisfied, then OS EXIT CRITICAL gets
called twice in a row without any intervening call to OS ENTER CRITICAL. One possible fix for this
problem is to add a return statement as indicated by the comment in the C code.
3.1 From assembly to C
The decompilation process converts the assembly program A to a C program, using the following general
strategy:
• The 32 GPRs are declared as global int variables r0 through r31. The 32 FPRs are declared as
global double variables f0 through f31. The SPRs are also declared as int variables cr, lr
and so on. All integer data is assumed to be in signed (two’s complement) 32-bit format and all
double data is assumed to be in IEEE 64-bit double precision format.
• Each label corresponding to a procedure name yields a procedure declaration. Since an assem-
bly program passes and returns all values via registers (i.e., global variables), our procedures are
void-void, i.e., they have no parameters or return values. In our example, we obtain a single
procedure declaration:
void OSMemNameSet(void)
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struct os_mem {
void *OSMemAddr ;
void *OSMemFreeList ;
unsigned int OSMemBlkSize ;
unsigned int OSMemNBlks ;
unsigned int OSMemNFree ;
char OSMemName[32] ;
};
typedef struct os_mem OS_MEM;
void OSMemNameSet(OS_MEM *pmem,
char *pname,unsigned char *err )
{
unsigned char len;
OS_ENTER_CRITICAL();
if ((unsigned int )pmem == (unsigned int )((OS_MEM *)0)) {
OS_EXIT_CRITICAL();
(*err) = 116;
//bug : there should most likely be a return here
//return;
}
if ((unsigned int )pname == (unsigned int )((char *)0)) {
OS_EXIT_CRITICAL();
(*err) = 15;
return;
}
if ((int )len > 31) {
OS_EXIT_CRITICAL();
(*err) = 119;
return;
}
OS_EXIT_CRITICAL();
(*err) = 0;
return;
}
OSMemNameSet:
stwu %r1,-48(%r1)
mflr %r0
stw %r31,44(%r1)
stw %r0,52(%r1)
mr %r31,%r1
stw %r3,8(%r31)
stw %r4,12(%r31)
stw %r5,16(%r31)
bl OS_ENTER_CRITICAL
lwz %r0,8(%r31)
cmpwi %cr7,%r0,0
bne %cr7,.L2
bl OS_EXIT_CRITICAL
lwz %r9,16(%r31)
li %r0,116
stb %r0,0(%r9)
.L2:
lwz %r0,12(%r31)
cmpwi %cr7,%r0,0
bne %cr7,.L3
bl OS_EXIT_CRITICAL
lwz %r9,16(%r31)
li %r0,15
stb %r0,0(%r9)
b .L1
.L3:
lbz %r0,20(%r31)
rlwinm %r0,%r0,0,0xff
cmplwi %cr7,%r0,31
ble %cr7,.L4
bl OS_EXIT_CRITICAL
lwz %r9,16(%r31)
li %r0,119
stb %r0,0(%r9)
b .L1
.L4:
bl OS_EXIT_CRITICAL
lwz %r9,16(%r31)
li %r0,0
stb %r0,0(%r9)
.L1:
lwz %r11,0(%r1)
lwz %r0,4(%r11)
mtlr %r0
lwz %r31,-4(%r11)
mr %r1,%r11
blr
Figure 1: A running example.
• Each label beginning with a dot results in a corresponding label in the C program. We strip off
the initial dot to conform to valid ANSI-C syntax. Thus, the C program generated in our example
contains four labels L1 through L4.
• Each assembly instruction gets translated to an equivalent sequence of C statements. In the rest
of this section, we describe the translation process for the instructions that appear in our example.
Note that the size of the resulting C program is linear in the size of the input assembly program.
3.2 Translating assembly instructions
PowerPCTM follows the Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) or the load-store paradigm. Thus,
there are no arithmetic, logical, or control-flow instructions that operate directly on data stored in mem-
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ory. All operations are performed on GPRs, FPRs, and SPRs. In order to operate on memory data, the
operands are loaded explicitly into registers, and the result is stored explicitly back to memory.
Assembly C statements
Loads and stores
lwz %r0,8(%r31) r0 = *((int*)(r31 + 8));
li %r0,116 r0 = 116;
lbz %r0,20(%r31) r0 = (*((int*)(r31 + 20))) & (0xff);
stwu %r1,-48(%r1) *((int*)(r1 - 48)) = r1; r1 = r1 - 48;
stw %r31,44(%r1) *((int*)(r1 + 44)) = r31;
stb %r0,0(%r9) *((int*)(r9 + 0)) =
((*((int*)(r9 + 0))) & 0xffffff00) | (r0 & 0xff);
Register operations
mr %r31,%r1 r31 = r1;
mflr %r0 r0 = lr;
mtlr %r0 lr = r0;
rlwinm %r0,%r0,0,255 r0 = (((r0 >> 32) & 0) | ((r0 << 0) & 0xffffffff))
& (0xff);
cmpwi %cr7,%r0,0 cr = (r0 < 0) ? (cr | 0x8) : (cr & 0xfffffff7);
cr = (r0 > 0) ? (cr | 0x4) : (cr & 0xfffffffb);
cr = (r0 == 0) ? (cr | 0x2) : (cr & 0xfffffffd);
cmplwi %cr7,%r0,31 cr = (r0 >= 0) && (r0 < 31) ?
(cr | 0x8) : (cr & 0xfffffff7);
cr = (r0 < 0) || (r0 > 31) ?
(cr | 0x4) : (cr & 0xfffffffb);
cr = (r0 >= 0) && (r0 == 31) ?
(cr | 0x2) : (cr & 0xfffffffd);
Conditional and unconditional jumps
b .L1 goto L1;
ble %cr7,.L4 if(!(cr & 0x4)) goto L4;
bne %cr7,.L2 if(!(cr & 0x2)) goto L2;
bl OS_ENTER_CRITICAL OS_ENTER_CRITICAL();
blr return;
Figure 2: Translation schema from assembly instructions to C statements.
Fig. 2 shows a table with assembly instructions on the left and the corresponding C statements on
the right. Among the instructions in Fig. 2, the following have straightforward translations: li = load
immediate, mr = move register, mflr = move from link register, mtlr = move to link
register, b = branch, bl = branch link, and blr = branch link return. The translations
for the other instructions can be understood on the basis of their semantics, as described below:
• lwz = load word and zero: loads a word from the memory location denoted by the second
argument to the register denoted by the first argument.
• lbz = load byte and zero: loads a byte from the source memory location S denoted by the
second argument to the target register T denoted by the first argument. The higher-order 24 bits of
T are set to zero. Due to little-endianness, if we load an integer from S, our desired byte will be
laid out at the lower order end. Now we have to zero out the higher-order 24 bits.
• stwu = store word with update: stores the word in source register S denoted by the first
argument to the target memory location T denoted by the second argument, and then sets the value
of S to T .
• stw = store word: stores the word in source register S denoted by the first argument to the
target memory location T denoted by the second argument.
• stb = store byte: stores the lowest byte in source register S denoted by the first argument to
the target memory location T denoted by the second argument. Again due to little-endianness, we
load the current word stored at T , replace its lowest byte with the lowest byte of S, and store the
new value back to T .
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• rlwinm = rotate left word immediate then AND with mask: rotates left the contents of
the source register S (denoted by the second argument) by the number of bits B (denoted by the
third argument), then logically ANDs the rotated data with a 32-bit mask BM (denoted by the
fourth argument), and stores the result in the target register T (denoted by the first argument).
To understand the comparison and jump instructions, we note that the condition register cr is logi-
cally partitioned into eight sub-registers cr0 ... cr7. The sub-registers are numbered from the higher
order bits to the lower order bits of cr as shown by the following diagram.
cr0 cr1 cr2 cr3 cr4 cr5 cr6 cr7
Thus, cr7 denotes the lowest four bits of cr. Further, suppose that the results of a comparison
between X and Y are stored in a condition sub-register R. Then the bits of R must be interpreted as
follows. The highest bit is 1 if and only if X <Y , the next bit is 1 if and only if X >Y , and the next bit is
1 if and only if X = Y . The lowest bit is reserved for overflows. We now present the translation scheme
for the remaining instructions.
• cmpwi = compare word immediate: compares the contents of the register denoted by the sec-
ond argument with the integer denoted by the third argument treating both values as signed inte-
gers, and stores the result in the condition sub-register denoted by the first argument.
• cmplwi = compare logical word immediate: compares the contents of the register denoted
by the second argument with the integer denoted by the third argument treating both values as
unsigned integers, and stores the result in the condition sub-register denoted by the first argument.
Since all our C variables are signed, we guard the C statement to be executed on conditions that
check for negative values in addition to the actual comparison being performed.
• ble = branch less equal : jumps to the label denoted by the second argument if the condition
sub-register denoted by the first argument indicates a “less or equal” comparison result.
• bne = branch not equal : jumps to the label denoted by the second argument if the condition
sub-register denoted by the first argument indicates a “not equal” comparison result.
This completes the description of the translation scheme for the instructions appearing in our exam-
ple. In total, to perform our experiments, translations were written for eighty nine PowerPC assembly
instructions. Complete details of the PowerPCTM ISA are available [29] online.
4 Verification
Once the target assembly program has been decompiled to a C program P, the second stage of AIR
involves the verification of P via SMC. For our experiments, we used the COPPER [13] SMC tool for
verification. For the purpose of AIR we only required the ability of COPPER to check for trace contain-
ment between sequential C programs and finite state machines. In addition, though our familiarity with
COPPER lead to its use in our experiments, any other C verification tool based on the SMC paradigm,
such as SLAM [3], MAGIC [9], or BLAST [19], is suitable for use in the verification stage of AIR.
Indeed, the main challenge involved in the use of SMC for AIR verification is tool-independent, and
arises from the need for precise handling of bit-level semantics during SMC1. In all cases, the handling of
bit-level semantics is delegated to the theorem prover used during predicate abstraction. Most often, the
1We note that the C bounded model checker CBMC [10] does obey precise bit-level semantics but does not use SMC.
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theorem prover (usually Simplify [26] or Vampyre [31]) treats the C bit-wise operators as uninterpreted
functions. For source code verification, this is not a major roadblock since many properties verified
on source code do not rely on the precise interpretation of bitwise operators. However, in the case of
AIR, precise interpretation of bitwise operations is crucial for verifying the C programs generated via
decompilation. In our initial experiments, not a single non-trivial property could be verified by leaving
the bitwise operators uninterpreted. We attempted several solutions to this problem, as discussed next.
Solution 1: Adding axioms. First, we added extra axioms about C bitwise operators to assist Simplify,
the default theorem prover used by COPPER. Unfortunately, this solution is ad hoc, since we had no way
of knowing if we had added enough axioms. Also, the performance of Simplify, in terms of both time
and memory consumption, degraded dramatically with increasing numbers of axioms. Ultimately, we
concluded that this approach would not scale to realistic programs.
Solution 2: Syntactic analysis. Next, we augmented COPPER with a set of syntactic bit-level analyses.
Specifically, before invoking Simplify, COPPER performs some simplifications on the formula whose
validity has to be checked. The transformations are targeted at specific patterns that arise in formulas due
to the structure of assembly programs. For example, a common query to Simplify is the validity of ((E
| 0x4) >> 2) & (0x1), where E is some C expression. Our technique is able to convert such formulas
to 0x1, whose validity can then be easily decided by Simplify. We call this solution uninterpreted since
all bitwise operators are left completely uninterpreted by the theorem prover.
Solution 3: Using a bit-vector decision procedure. We also compared the above approach to the idea
of replacing Simplify with the bit-vector decision procedure CPROVER [22] (we also experimented with
CVC Lite [15] but found CPROVER to be faster). We tried two variations of this idea. In the interpreted
variation, all formulas containing bitwise operators are solved using CPROVER. In the semi-interpreted
variation, formulas containing bitwise operators are first solved using Simplify. CPROVER is used only
if Simplify is unable to decide validity conclusively.
In our example, AIR is able to successfully report the bug in MICRO-C. When the bug is fixed, in
accordance with the suggestion in the comment, AIR successfully verifies the safety property. Also our
experiments indicate that the uninterpreted approach yields the best performance over a set of realistic
benchmarks. We now present full details of the empirical validation of our technique.
5 Experimental Validation
We experimented with a set of benchmarks derived from MICRO-C and Linux device drivers. All our
experiments were performed on a single core 2.4 GHz Pentium computer running RedHat 9. We imposed
a time limit of one hour, and memory limit of one GB. We derived a set of eleven benchmarks – one from
MICRO-C, and the rest from Linux 2.6.11.10 kernel drivers – by compiling C source code with gcc-3.2.
For each example, we checked that a certain “lock” was being acquired and released properly. The nature
of the lock varied with the example. For MICRO-C, the lock was an invocation of OS ENTER CRITICAL,
while for the Linux drivers it was a call to spin lock, spin lock irq or spin lock irqsave. The
“unlock” was derived accordingly.
We initially observed that COPPER is easily able to verify the safety property for all our benchmarks
because the locks and unlocks are paired up syntactically. In other words, an analysis of the control
flow graph suffices and no further predicate abstraction is necessary. To make our benchmarks more
interesting, we added data dependencies between the locks and unlocks. Essentially we guarded the
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Name Interpreted Semi-Interpreted Uninterpreted BLAST
KLOC T M I T M I T M I CE T M I
Micro-C 10 * 164 - * 164 - 305 70 31 - * 67 -
aha152x 33 2319 121 16 * 107 - 198 74 16 - * 141 -
DAC960 45 * 193 - * 142 - 520 107 16 × 61 128 6278
devices 17 1018 41 17 3523 45 18 350 40 19 × 202 60 96701
ide 26 510 61 15 557 61 15 25 34 15 - * 105 -
ipr 35 * 285 - * 288 - 310 79 19 × 30 100 1230
message 21 194 28 26 145 28 25 29 27 26 × 16 63 831
mxser 22 699 53 19 547 52 19 129 46 19 × 6 51 1302
synclink 34 123 33 15 106 33 15 15 30 15 × 40 89 4292
tg3 61 988 77 18 907 77 18 168 70 21 × 84 152 11496
tlan 31 312 63 7 242 63 7 73 49 7 × 25 88 2062
Figure 3: Results for non-buggy benchmarks. KLOC = 1000 lines of assembly; T = time in seconds;
M = memory in MB; I = # of iterations; * means that the resource was exhausted; - means that no
measurement was available; × means that the counterexample returned by BLAST is spurious. Best
figures are highlighted.
Name Interpreted Semi-Interpreted Uninterpreted BLAST
KLOC T M I T M I T M I CE T M I
Micro-C 10 * 164 - * 164 - * 70 - - * 67 -
aha152x 33 357 53 10 321 53 10 84 49 18 × 40 98 8681
DAC960 45 1208 138 13 1017 138 13 388 107 13 × 70 130 6272
devices 17 1260 * 14 * 46 - * 43 - × 281 59 96697
ide 26 * 75 - * 67 - * 39 - - * 105 -
ipr 35 2009 280 6 1949 280 6 205 76 6 × 37 99 1230
message 21 62 26 11 76 26 11 6 24 11 × 16 63 831
mxser 22 115 50 6 108 50 6 76 45 6 × 8 50 1302
synclink 34 120 35 10 212 36 16 27 32 16 × 34 89 4292
tg3 61 2115 77 17 849 77 11 219 68 12 × 88 152 11496
tlan 31 362 63 7 354 63 7 98 49 7 × 34 89 2062
Figure 4: Results for buggy benchmarks. KLOC =KLOC of assembly; T = time in seconds; M =memory
in MB; I = # of iterations; * means that the resource was exhausted; - means that no measurement was
available; × means that the counterexample returned by BLAST is spurious. Best figures are highlighted.
locks and unlocks with a non-deterministic value. Since the same value guards both lock and unlock the
examples are still correct.
We experimented using the interpreted, semi-interpreted and uninterpreted approaches presented in
Section 4. In the first two cases, the syntactic simplifications were also applied. As a control, we also
used BLAST version 1.0. The results of our experiments with these benchmarks are summarized in Fig. 3.
Next, for each benchmark, we created a buggy version by artificially inserting errors and repeated our
experiments. The results for our experiments with the the buggy examples are summarized in Fig. 4.
We observe that the uninterpreted approach exhibits the best overall performance. The interpreted
approach beats the semi-interpreted approach by successfully proving more examples. This indicates
that almost all the formulas involving bitwise operators could not be proved by Simplify and hence had
to be further delegated to CPROVER. This is also consistent with our initial failure with only Simplify
(without the syntactic simplifications). BLAST returns counterexamples for both the correct and buggy
examples. Upon closer inspection, all counterexamples returned by BLAST are found to be spurious. We
note that this is essentially due to BLAST’s dependency on Simplify.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented AIR, a framework for verifying safety properties of assembly language programs via
SMC. We have proposed a number of approaches for more precise handling of bit-level semantics during
SMC and empirically validated their relative effectiveness. Overall, our experiments indicate that AIR is
effective on real-life benchmarks derived from an embedded OS and Linux device drivers.
It is worthwhile to consider a few issues concerning the AIR approach. Decompiling an assembly
program, though much less difficult than verifying the resulting C program, requires careful attention
to detail. Whether the target platform is big or little endian and whether a 0 or a 1 is shifted in on >>
operations on signed integers are two such intricacies. Correctly modeling elements of the program’s
environment such as the contents of the PowerPCTM machine state register are more complicated. Other
decisions must be guided by the capabilities of the model checker; for example, choosing whether to
denote a comparison that treats two operands as unsigned quantities by using type casting and a simple
comparison or by using more predicates and checking different conditions depending on the signs of the
operands. Moreover, the correct handling of pointer aliasing during verification is crucial for maintaining
the overall soundness of AIR. Finally, though AIR is applicable to any assembly program, it is not
necessarily a good choice in many cases. The broad applicability of AIR comes at a cost in usability.
Encoding properties in terms of elements of the assembly program may be more difficult then encoding
the same property against, for example, a C program. Similarly, interpreting a counterexample expressed
in terms of an assembly program is likely to be more difficult. However, these concerns are much less
important when it is sufficient to know whether a property holds (or not), or when source is unavailable.
In summary, we believe that the AIR approach has important ramifications for the development of
effective low-level software verification techniques. Specifically, AIR is applicable to verifying other
low-level languages such as Java bytecode and MSIL. Programs in these languages generally contain ad-
ditional information (such as variable names) that should further increase AIR’s effectiveness. AIR is also
adoptable for the purpose of using certifying model checking [23] for proof carrying code (PCC) [25].
Certifying model checking in combination with abstraction has been used [24, 8] to construct invariants
and ranking functions for the purpose of certifying source code. By generating source code from binaries,
AIR enables us to leverage the above technology for the PCC-style certification of binaries. Finally, there
is a growing trend of implementing hardware functionality using software, such as microcode, in the do-
main of hardware-software co-design. We believe that AIR would also be applicable for the verification
of such low-level programs.
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